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NOTES UPON THE TRAVERSE DE INJURIA.
This traverse, which occurs generally in the replication, was an
iugenious device of the old pleaders to evade the stringency of
the rule which forbade more than one replication to a plea, and was
in fact a sort of general issue replication.
The general issues applicable to actions ex contractV, as well to
the old action of debt as to the more modern actions of trespass
on the case, and assumpsit, were much more comprehensive in
their scope, and opened a much wider field of inquiry than the
general issues in the forms of action ex delicto. The latter, as
a general rule, put in issue only the specific allegations of the
declaration. Matters of excuse or justification, which were admissible in evidence under the general issue in actions founded on
contract, were excluded when the action was founded on tort. " In
those cases the defendant was driven to special pleading to introduce his defence, and this he might do under the statute by use
of the formula, " With leave of the Court first had and obtained,"
in as many pleas as Le thought proper. This liberality was not,
however, extended to the replication, and in consequence the
plaintiff in his reply was restricted to the denial of some one or
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other of the allegations which went to make up each plea. And
as this denial was an admission of the other allegations not embraced in the issue, it put the plaintiff at great disadvantage. To
remedy this the ingenuity of the ancient pleaders invented the
traverse "de injuria sua propria absque tali causa," as it was
called, which, in cases to which it was applicable, had the effect
of throwing upon the defendant the necessity of proving all the
material allegations in his plea, just as the issue non assumpsit
threw upon the plaintiff the burden of proving all the allegations
in his declaration.
The introduction in England, in Hilary Term 1834, of the New
Rules of Pleading, as they are still called, by which the effect of
the general issue in actions ex contraetu was made to be the mere
denial of the precise facts alleged in the declaration: thus compelling defendants to plead specially all defences by way of excuse
or justification, and involving the plaintiff.in the embarrassments
and difficulties growing out of the rule which limited him to a
single replication to each plea, induced an examination in England
into the applicability of this replication to actions ex contractu, to
which it was found as well suited as to actions ex delicto. Its
availability in such cases is not recognised in any American
decisions known to the writer.
Like most other forms of pleading, this derives its name from
prominent words used in the original form-the equivalent words
at the present day being "of his own wrong, and without the
cause in his plea alleged-" without," "absque hoc," cc absque
tali causa," are words adopted in all formal traverses. They
express a negative, as used in this replication, signifying "- and
not for;" accordingly the language of the older entries sometimes
is , et nemal per tiel cause."
Crogate's Case, 8th Reports 66, is the leading authority on this
subject. Edward Crogate brought an action of trespass 'against
one Robert Marys for driving his cattle, and the defendant
pleaded in effect that the cattle were trespassing on the ground
of one William Marys, and the defendant, as servant to the said
William, and by his command, molliter (without unnecessary vio-
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lence), drove the cattle out of the said place, &c. The plaintiff
replied de inJuria. &c., upon which the defendant demurred in
law.
The plaintiff contended that the replication was good, because
the defendant did not claim any interest, but justified by force
of a commandment, and that de injuria sun propria shall refer
only to the commandment, and to no other part of the plea. Bu
the replication was pronounced insufficient, and four resolutions
were come to:First. That the words absque tali causa do refer to the whole
plea; and therefore in false imprisonment if the defendant justifies
by a capias to the sheriff, and a warrant from him to the defendant de injuria is no good replication, for then matter of record,
namely, the capias, will be parcel of the cause, as well as the
warrant from the sheriff to the defendant, for all makes but one
cause; and matter of record ought not to be put in issue to the
jury, but the plaintiff may in such case reply de injuria, and
traverse the warrant which is matter of fact. But the resolution
goes on to say, upon sich justification by force of any proceeding
in the Admiralty Court, hundred, or County Court, or any other
which is not a Court of record, there de injuria generally is good,
for all is matter of fact, and all makes but one cause.
Second. -Where the defendant in his own right, or 'as a servant
to another, claims any interest in the land, or any common or rent
growing out of the land; or any way or passage upon the land,
&c., there de injuria generally is no plea. But if the defendant
justifies as a servant, there de injuria in some of thq said cases,
with a traverse of the commandment, the same being made material, -is good ; for the general replication de injuria is properly
when the defendant's plea doth consist merely upon excuse, and
upon no matter of interest whatsoever."
In New York it is held, notwithstanding the latter part of the
first resolution, in Crogate's Case, that de injuria is not a proper
replication when the plea sets up justification under the authority
of a Court not of record. Because they say the second rule in
Crogate's Case is that de injuria is only proper where the matter
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pleaied offers an excuse, not where it insists that the matter com.
plained of was done in the performance or discharge of a lawfully
imposed right or duty: Coburn vs. Hopkins, 4 Wend. 577; Lijtle
vs. Lee, 5 Johns. Rep. 114 ; and see Catterall vs. Lees, 8 Mann.,
Grang., and Scott 113; 65 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 113; where Mr.
Justice MAULE uses this language: "The replication de injurais
only applicable to a plea which shows that the plaintiff never at
any time had a cause of action against the defendant;" and the
Court apparently adopted the argument of counsel when they say,
"The fallacy is in confounding an exemption from liability existing at the time of the act done, with an exemption from liability
at the time of the action brought-de injuria can only be replied
where the plea sets up matter existing at the time of the act
done, which gives a primd facie and apparent cause of action.
The defendant does not say by his plea that at the time at which
the cause of action is.
alleged to have accrued h-" was not liable;
he admits the cause of action, and sets up matter of subsequent
discharge. But there is a manifest distinction between such pleas
and those which rely upon matter of discharge and extinguishment
of the right of action; as to which latter class no authority has been
cited to show the general form of traverse is allowable, and indeed
it is excluded by the very terms of the rule above referred to.
Thus in a plea of payment, or accord and satisfaction, or release,
or of any matter which extinguishes the right to sue, both the
rules of pleading and the course and practice, from the earliest
time, require the plaintiff to make a traverse of, or to deny the
material fact stated in the plea, which constitutes the discharge or
extinguishment of the right of action."
The third resolution in Crogate's Case is, "That when by the
defendant's plea any authority or power is mediately or immediately derived from the plaintiff, there, although no interest be
claimed, the plaintiff ought to answer it, and shall not reply
generally de injuria sua propria." This resolution is fully recognised and acted upon in thb case of Milner vs. Jordan, 8 Adol. &
Ellis 620; 55 Eng.Com. Law Rep. 620.
In Salter vs. .Purchell,in the Exchequer Chamber, I Adol. &
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Ellis 210 (41 Eng. Com. Law 506), Chief Justice TINDAL thus
clearly explains the rule: "The rule by which the plaintiff has
been permitted to use this general form of replication, instead of
being compelled to take issue on some material fact stated in the
defendant's plea, has always been limited in its terms and in its
application to cases of actions brought for personal injuries, where
the facts stated in the plea amount merely to matter of excuse or
justification of the act complained of. As where in trespass for
assault and battery there is a plea of son assault demesne, or a
plea of molliter manus imzposuit in defence of possession ; or in
false imprisonment, where there is a plea that the plaintiff broke
the peace, and that he the defendant being a constable and
present, took him in order to carry him to a justice of the peace;
or in an action on the case for defamation, where the plea justifies
by reason of the truth of the words spoken; in all which and
similar instances the facts stated in the plea show that at the time
the act complained of was done, it was done under circumstances
which make it excusable or justifiable in the eye of the law. And
it is to such pleas only that the rule in Orogate's Case applies.
The fourth resolution in Crogate's Case determined that under
the particular facts in that case, the issue would be full of multiplicity of matter, when an issue ought to be full and single; that
is to say, that de injuria being a denial of the whole 'plea, would
in that case be bad for duplicity.
The fourth resolution is not adhered to in modern practice as
closely as the other three. The case of O'Brien vs. Saxon, for
instance, 2 Barn. & Cress. 918, 9 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 908, was
an action for maliciously suing out a commission of bankruptcy
against the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff
being a trader, and being indebted to the defendant in the sum of
1001., became bankrupt, whereupon the defendant sued out the
commission. Replication de injuria, demurrer assigning for cause
that the plaintiff by the replication had attempted to put in issue
three distinct facts-the act of bankruptcy, the trading, and the
petitioning creditor's debt. The Court overruled the demurrer,
because the three facts connected together constituted but one
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entire proposition. See also Selby vs. Bardons, 28 Eng. Com. Law
Rep. 1; 3 Earn. & Adol. 1. An avowry in replevin set up " that
the plaintiff was an inhabitant of that part of St. Andrews,
Holborn,.which is above the bars, and occupier of a tenement in
the parish of St. -George the Martyr; that the rate was duly
made and published for those districts, in .which the plaintiff was
rated at 71., of which the defendant who was collector gave him
notice and demanded payment, which being refused he summoned
him before the justices where he appeared, but showing no causo
for his refusal the justices made their warrant to defendant to
distrain, under which he and the other defendant as his bailiff
took the goods and chattels in the declaration mentioned as a
distress. Plea, de injuria and demurrer.
The demurrer was overruled by Justices PATTESoN and PARKE,
Lord TENTERDEX, the Chief Justice, dissenting. This judgment
was afterwards affirmed in the Exchequer, Chief Justice TINDAL
delivering the opinion-: 3 Tyrwh. 431.
The applicability of this traverse to actions ex contractu has, as
has already 'been said, been much considered in recent times.
Lord DENMAN, in Purhell vs. Salter, 1 Adol. & Ellis 501, says:
"Upon the best consideration we can give it, we think that if the
law allows a plaintiff to say that the defendant of his own wrong,
and without the cause alleged in his plea, committed the trespass
(as in trespass), or took the goods and cattle (as in replevin), or
spoke or published the words, or published the libel (as in defamation), or committed the grievances (as in malicious prosecution), or
allows again to a defendant, where the pleadings go beyond a
replication, to say that the cattle, for instance, were in the close
of the plaintiff, of the wrong and injury of the plaintiff, and
without the cause by him in his pleading, as the case may be, in
trespass or replevin alleged. So also it should seem that the
principles of pleading may be extended to say that a defendant
of his own wrong, and with6ut the cause, &c., broke the covenant,
or broke the promise, &c., or refused to pay the debt, or, if the
form be liked better, broke the contract; or in debt (if the language 'of his own wrong' ought not to, be introduced into actions
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of debt, these words might be altogether omitted), and it might be
said that the defendant, without the cause alleged, refused to pay
the debt, &c. But if this compendious form of replication be
allowed in these actions, it may be necessary to confine the plaintiff within some limits. And in considering that there are a number
of exceptions to this general pleading laid down in Crogate's Case;
and though these rules may be thought not to have a direct application to actions on promises and debt ; yet we think that if in
consequence of a new practice of pleading being introduced, a
form of replication not before in use in any particular form of
action should be adopted into it from some other, the most convenient course is also to adopt the rules and exceptions which had
applied to it in that form, as far as they are properly applicable
to the class of actions in which they are so addpted."
This reasoning has been considered conclusive in England, and
a. great variety of cases illustrate its application in practice. The
distinction between matter of excuse and matter of discharge is
kept up quite rigidly as matter of doctrine, though the practical
application has in some cases been found embarrassing, and perhaps all the decisions on that subject are not quite consistent.
The general rule, no doubt, is properly stated in these words:
When the defendant's plea consists of mere matter of excuse, the
plaintiff may reply generally, that the defendant broke his promise without the cause alleged, and so put the whole plea in
issue.
Matter of excuse, to be put in issue by the replication de injuria,
must be such in the first place as admits the contrac.t, and in the
second such as is not in the nature of a discharge or acquittance.
Thus in Scott vs. CUhappelow, 4 Mann. & Grang. 336 (4-3 E. C. L. R.
179), the action was against the acceptor of certain bills of exchange, who pleaded specially at length certain matters which
amounted to an allegation of no consideration for the acceptance,
the replication de injuria and demurrer followed. The replication
was held good, MAULE, J., saying, "The rule in Crogate's Case,
which is founded in good sense, is this: If the cause of action be
admitted, but an excuse is set up, by which the defendant does not
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claim any interest in the matter of dispute, or rely upon any au
thority derived from the plaintiff, or given by law, then,- the gene-.
ral replication de injuria is sufficient, and the reason seems to be
that it would be hard to put the plaintiff to traverse one fact only,
when the defendant's excuse consists of several. Now, the substance of this declaration is, that the defendant accepted two bills
of exchange, which were drawn upon him by the plaintiffs. This
is admitted by the plea, and therefore a prim d facie cause of action
is admitted by the defendant; but he says that he is excused from
paying the bills by reason of the spepial matter, which, he states,
if any portion of this excuse had arisen from an authority derived
from the plaintiffs not to pay-as if the defendant had set up
accord and satisfaction-I think the case would have fallen within
the exception in Crvgate's Case." See also Basan vs. Arnold, 6
Mees. & Wels. 559; Beynolds vs. Blackburne, 7 Ad. & Ellis 161
(E. C. L. R. vol. 34); Griffin vs. Yates, 2 Bing. N. C. 579 (E. C. L.
R. vol. 29) ; and it issaid, whenever fraud is of the essence of the
defence, de injuria may be replied: Bennett vs. Ball, 1 Exch. 593;
Tolhurst vs. Xotley, 11 Ad. & Ellis, N. S. 406 (E. C. L. R. 404).
This replication applies as well in debt as in assumpsit: Cowper
vs. Garbett, 13 i. & W. 33.
In the following cases the replication was not allowed, because
the defence set up by the plea consisted of matter of discharge:
Jones et al. vs. Senior, 4 Mees. & W. 123; £leworth vs. Pickford,
7 MI. & W. 314. In the following cases it was held that de injuriia could not be replied, because the plea was a denial of any
cause of action, not an excuse for non-performance: .Ewell vs.
Grand June. B. Co. 5 Mees. & W. 669; WThittaker vs. Mason, 2
Bing. N. C. 359 (E. 0. L. R. vol. 29) ; Schild vs. Kilpin, 8 NI.
& W. 673.
If the plea is in substance set-off, de injuria cannot be replied:
Salter vs. Purchell, 1 Ad. & Ell. or Queen's Bench 209.
The subject does not seem to have been much considered in the
American Courts. In Tubbs vs. Caswell, 8 Wend. 129, the Court
expresses the opinion that de injuria can only be used in actions
ex delicto, and in Coffin vs. Bassett, 2 Pick. 357, they so decided.

